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Evans and Jovanovic (1989) ¯nd that wealth is an important determinant of
business startups due to liquidity constraints. However, Cressy (2000) argues
that if risk aversion is a negative function of wealth, Evans and Jovanovic's
empirical results could be spurious and the positive e®ect of wealth could be
due to the omission of risk aversion in the regression equation. In other words,
according to Cressy, one's wealth does not have any e®ect on business startups
once the degree of risk aversion is accounted for. This paper attempts to inves-
tigate the validity of Cressy's conjecture. We empirically examine the e®ect of
wealth on the transition into self-employment, while allowing for the e®ect of
risk aversion. Our empirical ¯ndings show that Evans and Jovanovic's (1989)
results are robust, i.e., wealth has a positive e®ect on business startups even
allowing for the confounding e®ects of risk aversion.
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The transition into self-employment has been researched extensively. Most put an extra
emphasis on the importance of personal wealth. A notable study in this strand of research
is Evans and Jovanovic (1989). The paper employs a sample of U.S. youths to estimate a
structural model of the choice of whether or not to become an entrepreneur, taking into
account the tightness of liquidity constraints and controlling for the correlation between
wealth and ability. Evans and Jovanovic (1989) ¯nd a positive e®ect of wealth on business
startups and interpret it as evidence of binding liquidity constraints. Similar results have
been obtained by others, e.g., Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen (1994), Lindh and Ohlsson
(1996), Blanch°ower and Oswald (1999), and Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000), who, however,
mostly focus on the status of self-employment rather than the behavior of business startups.
By contrast, in the theoretical literature models of entrepreneurial choice emphasize the
role of risk aversion. As early as the work by Cantillon (1755), Marshall (1890) and Knight
(1921), entrepreneurs are being viewed as risk-bearers.1 In more recent papers, e.g., Kanbur
(1979) and Kihlstrom and La®ont (1979), the degree of risk aversion plays a prominent role
in one's entrepreneurial decision, such that more risk averse individuals are self-selected into
paid employment and more risk tolerant individuals become entrepreneurs. Following the
thread of these studies, Cressy (2000) proposes an alternative explanation of the positive
e®ect of the amount of wealth on business startups as obtained by studies in the empirical
literature.2
It is argued by Cressy (2000) that the positive relationship between one's wealth and busi-
ness startup may arise from decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA). When the absolute
risk aversion decreases with wealth, a positive correlation between one's wealth and business
startup will be observed even though liquidity constraints are not e®ective in preventing
1In contrast, Schumpeter (1911) views entrepreneurs as innovators.
2This conjecture is actually supported by Cressy (1996), who ¯nd that liquidity constraints is endogenous,
implying that wealth is not important in business startups.
1business startups. When one's wealth increases, the individual's degree of risk aversion also
decreases making her more willing to accept the more risky occupation of entrepreneurship.
The argument is expounded by a theoretical model.
The alternative explanation proposed by Cressy (2000) seems plausible. However, since
it is not empirically tested, it remains a conjecture. The purpose of the present paper is
to empirically verify Cressy's conjecture.3 Our investigation consists of two parts. We ¯rst
look at the relationship between one's degree of risk aversion and an individual's level of
wealth to see whether the DARA preference structure is valid within our sample. After
that we empirically test whether wealth is related to business startups when risk aversion is
controlled for.
The data we use are drawn from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) conducted
by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan. The PSID data contains rich
information on the respondents' socioeconomic characteristics, especially about respondents'
employment conditions. The measure of risk aversion used in the present study is developed
by Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997). The measurement, available in the PSID




Our estimation is based on a sample consisting of 2259 households over the years 1995{
1997, where each sample household could be included for a maximum of three times and a
minimum of one time in the sample. There are a total of 6292 observations. Based on the
PSID early release data, we include all households who have ever been interviewed in any
3It is noted that in the empirical literature, there are studies investigating the e®ect of risk aversion
on business startups (notably Van Praag and Cramer, 2001, and Cramer, Hartog, Jonker, and Van Praag,
2002). However these studies do not control for wealth simultaneously.
2year between 1995{1997. Following previous studies (e.g, Fairlie, 1999) we delete from the
sample observations pertaining to household heads who had an agriculture occupation, who
were older than 65 or younger than 18, or not working for money in the previous or current
survey year. Households are also excluded from the sample if there are any missing values
in the data pertaining to those households.
Our variable of interest pertains to whether a previously employed household head be-
comes self-employed or not between years t ¡ 1 and t, which is denoted as St. We are
interested in whether one's self-employment variable is determined by his/her level of wealth
and degree of risk aversion. We explain the construction of these two variables in detail
below.
Data on Wealth
Data on one's wealth (denoted WEALTHt) come from the 1994 wave of the PSID, which
has a module of questions soliciting detailed information on respondents' assets. The variable
WEALTHt is equal to the sum of the value of a respondent's principal residence, other real
estate assets, vehicles, businesses or farms, stocks, bonds, annuity, and pension, minus the
amount of all debts and mortgages. The mean of WEALTHt in our sample is $91,710 and
the median is $26,330. The mean level of wealth in our sample is substantially above that in
Evans and Jovanovic's (1989) sample (i.e., $20,009). This may be because respondents in our
sample were substantially older (aged 38 on average) than those in Evans and Jovanovic's
(1989) sample (aged 24{34), and because measurement has taken place ¯ve calendar years
later.
Data on Risk Aversion
Information on households' risk aversion (denoted 1=µ) is collected in the 1996 PSID sur-
vey as a supplement. The PSID solicited respondents' risk aversion based on a sequence of
¯ve questions, asking about the respondent's willingness to take jobs with di®erent prospects
in the 1996 wave of the survey. Each question asks whether a respondent is willing to accept
a new job with a 50-50 chance to double one's income or to cut the income in di®erent propor-
3tions:4
(Q1) A respondent was initially asked whether he/she would accept a job with 50% chance
of doubling income combined with a 50% chance of cutting income by 1
3.
(Q2) If the respondent was willing to take a chance and answers yes, he/she is asked about
his/her willingness to accept a job with 50% chance of doubling income, combined with
a 50% chance of cutting income by 1
2.
(Q3) If the respondent answered yes again, he/she was asked whether he/she is willing to
accept a job with 50% chance of doubling income, and 50% chance of a 3
4 cut.
(Q4) If, however, the respondent answered no to the initial double or one-third option,
he/she would be asked his willingness to accept a 1
5 cut in income instead.
(Q5) If he/she answered no again, he/she would be asked about his/her willingness to
accept only a 1
5 cut instead.
These questions were asked if a respondent in fact has a job. Therefore, our sample
excludes those respondents who were not working in 1996.
Assuming that the utility function for individual i is characterized by constant relative







where ci denotes consumption, answers to the above questions allow for the estimation of
the parameter µi (the risk tolerance parameter), and the risk aversion is derived as 1=µi.
The estimation proceeds as follows. Assume that the realized risk aversion for individual i
(denoted yi) is related to the true one (i.e., µi) as
yi = µi + ui; (1)
where ui is a normally distributed measurement error. Based on an respondent's answers to
questions in the risk tolerance module (denoted y¤
ji), a range Bji = fba
ji;bb
jig (i.e., a pair of
cuto® points) is obtained, where y¤
ji represents a sequence of binary (1/0) variables (indexed
by j) indicating which o®er individual i accepts. While we do not know the exact value of
4The exact wording of the questions can be found on the PSID website at
http://www.isr.umich.edu/src/psid/.
4yi, from y¤




















where ©(¢) is the standard normal cumulative function, and µj, a parameter to be estimated,
is equal to the expectation of µi conditional on y¤
ji. The estimate b µi is obtained from b µj and
y¤
ji. It is noted that the estimation is similar to that of ordered probit/logit. The di®erence
lies in the fact that we have known cuto® points fba
ji;bb
jig in (2), while the cuto® points are
parameters to be estimated in conventional ordered probit/logit models.6
Two estimates of µj are provided by the PSID, one is not corrected for measurement
errors and the other one is corrected for measurement errors. We use the estimate that is
corrected for measurement errors and use the inverse of µ as a measurement of risk aversion.
Under the CRRA preference structure, based on which our risk aversion measure is






























































@c < 0, which is an implication
of DARA. It is noted that even though both CRRA and DARA preferences exhibit decreasing













5For example, if a respondent rejected the o®er of the 50-50 chance of doubling the income and a 50-50













c1¡1=µi, implying that the realized risk tolerance
for the individual is 0 < yi · 0:1329.
6See Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997).
50. The above analysis suggests that if the CRRA preference structure is correct, our risk
aversion measure is uncorrelated with wealth.
Other Control Variables
To explain the decision to enter into self-employment, we also use a set of other socioeco-
nomic variables as control variables in the self-employment regression model, namely, age (de-
noted AGEt¡1), age squared (denoted AGESQt¡1), marital status (denoted MSt¡1), length
of job tenure (denoted JOBTENt¡1), length of job tenure squared (denoted JOBTENSQt¡1),
whether the household head is African American (denoted AA), family size (denoted FSt¡1),
years of education (denoted EDU), the amount of previous year's labor income (denoted
INCOMEt¡1, at 1993 constant dollar), amount of cash (including money in checking and
savings accounts) as of survey year 1994 (denoted CASHt, at 1993 constant dollar), whether
one's father is self-employed (denoted FSELF), and amount of lump sum cash received
(denoted LUMPSUMPt¡1, at 1993 constant dollar). A more detailed description of the
variables is displayed in Table 1.
3 Method and Results
Empirical Analysis of Risk Aversion
Before looking at the estimation results pertaining to the model for self-employment, we
would like to explore the relationship between risk aversion and wealth. Using the ordinary
least squares model, we regress a respondent's degree of risk aversion 1=µ on a set of socioe-
conomic variables (including total wealth, denoted WEALTHt). Since both the amount of
1994 wealth and the degree of risk aversion is time invariant, we use only one year's data
(those pertaining to 1996, when the risk aversion information was collected) to estimate the
relationship between the two variables, i.e.,
1=µi = °
0xit¡1 + ei; (3)
where xit¡1 is a set of socioeconomic variables (including an individual's stock of wealth).
6The results are presented in Table 2. We ¯rst check the validity of some of the assumptions
underlying the OLS model, namely normality and homoskedasticity of the error term ei.7
The test statistics in Table 2 suggest that both normality and homoskedasticity are rejected.
In view of this, we adopt another estimation method, which is robust to the invalidity of
these two assumptions. Instead of using the OLS method, we use the Least Absolute Devia-
tions (LAD) method (see, e.g., Bassett and Koenker, 1978), which does not depends on the
normality assumption.8 The standard errors of our estimated coe±cients are obtained by
the bootstrap method (see Efron and Tibshirani, 1993), which is non-parametric. The esti-
mates of the standard errors are heteroskedasticity consistent. The LAD with bootstrapped
t-statistics are also reported in Table 2.
The CRRA assumption suggests that there does not exist a relationship between 1=µ and
WEALTHt¡1, while DARA is consistent with any relationship between 1=µ and WEALTHt¡1.
Thus, if we our empirical results suggest a statistically signi¯cant relationship between 1=µ
and WEALTHt¡1, then this ¯nding is inconsistent with CRRA.
The results, as presented in the second column of Table 2, suggest that, with the co-
e±cient of wealth being statistically insigni¯cant at conventional levels, one's wealth and
degree of risk aversion are statistically almost uncorrelated. This suggests that the sample
respondents' preferences are consistent with the CRRA and the DARA structure, which
is characterized by the absence of relationship between wealth and relative risk aversion.
Our ¯nding implies that Cressy's (2000) conjecture that absolute risk aversion decreases
7Our normality test is based on the Shapiro-Francia test. Our test for heteroskedasticity is based on the




where b ei is the predicted residual b ei = 1=µi ¡ b °
0xit¡1 from the estimation of (3). The test statistic is N R2,
where R2 is the R-squared of the above regression, N is the sample size, and N R2 » Â2
K with K being the
number of regressors in xit¡1 excluding the constant term.
8The LAD estimator minimizes the sum of absolute residuals, i.e.,





7with wealth (i.e., DARA) is valid. However, our ¯nding is somewhat in contrast to Guiso
and Paiella's (2001), who derive a measure of survey respondents' risk aversion based on a
question soliciting the respondents' willingness to pay to enter a lottery and ¯nd that this
measure of risk aversion is inconsistent with a CRRA utility function.
Another pertinent ¯nding is the e®ect of income (INCOMEt¡1) on 1=µ. If one's income
is correlated with consumption and does not have any direct e®ect on risk aversion, then





































This implies that the coe±cient of INCOMEt¡1 in (3) should also be statistically in-
signi¯cant. This prediction is not borne out in our results, i.e., the association between
INCOMEt¡1 and 1=µ is actually positive and statistically signi¯cant. This suggests that
labor income has a direct e®ect on one's risk aversion. Since an individual's amount of wealth
is controlled for in the regression and it is found to be uncorrelated with his/her degree of
risk aversion, the association between the degree of risk aversion and labor income is unlikely
to arise from labor income's wealth e®ect. With labor income being a function of working
hours, it is possible that the positive coe±cient of labor income on 1=µ is generated by the
interdependence between the preferences for leisure and those for consumption (i.e., 1=µ).
The estimation results also show that an individual with more years of education is less
risk averse. The length of job tenure has a quadratic relationship with the degree of risk
aversion. It initially increases with an individual's degree of risk aversion. The association
becomes negative as the length of job tenure increases further. By contrast, an individual's
age, family size, marital status, race, father's self-employment status, amount of cash holding,
and amount of lump sum payment received do not bear a statistically signi¯cant relationship
with his/her degree of risk aversion.
Determinants of the Transition into Self-employment
8Now we turn to the results pertaining to the self-employment decision. The dependent
variable (denoted Sit) pertains to whether individual i, who was previously employed, be-
comes self-employed between years t¡1 and t. Since it is discrete, we employ a probit model





1 (becomes self-employed); if ¯
0xit¡1 + ²it > 0;
0 (stay employed); otherwise;
(4)
where xit¡1 is a vector of socioeconomic variables, pertaining to year t ¡ 1, including one's
degree of risk aversion and wealth, ¯ is a vector of coe±cients and ²it is a mean-zero, unit-
variance and normally-distributed random variable (i.e., the so-called error term).
The regression results pertaining to the self-employment transition probability are pre-
sented in the ¯rst column of Table 3. We have estimated two versions of the model, one
with random e®ects (to account for the panel structure of the data) and one without. 9 We
¯nd that the standard error of the individual e®ect is statistically insigni¯cant, indicating
the su±ciency of the speci¯cation without random e®ects. Since the random e®ects speci-
¯cation is not necessary (i.e., overspeci¯ed), we rely on the estimation results of the model
without random e®ects. Actually, comparing the two sets of results (i.e., with and without
the random e®ects speci¯cation), we ¯nd that the coe±cient estimates and t-statistics are
almost exactly identical.
The coe±cient of net wealth (i.e., WEALTHt¡1) on entering into self-employment is
positive and, with a t-statistic of 2.55, the coe±cient is highly signi¯cant.10 This result
is congruent with Evans and Jovanovic's (1989). Thus, Evans and Jovanovic's (1989) em-
pirical result concerning the positive relationship between wealth and the transition into
self-employment (implying the presence of binding liquidity constraints) is robust to the
9In the random e®ect speci¯cation, the error term ²it are assumed to be composed of two terms, ´i and ºit,
where ´i » Normal(0;¾2
´) (the random e®ects) and ºit » Normal(0;¾2
º). If ¾´ is found to be statistically
signi¯cant we can conclude that the random e®ects ´i is present (i.e., the random e®ects speci¯cation is
valid), and vice versa.
10It is acknowledged that wealth is endogenous since ability, which is an omitted variable, is potentially
correlated with wealth. Since one's wealth and ability are likely to be positively correlated, the omission of
ability may in°ate the size of estimate of wealth's e®ect on the transition into self-employment.
9omission of risk aversion in their empirical analysis. This demonstrates that, despite the fact
that the DARA preference structure proposed by Cressy (2000) is found to be consistent
with our empirical results, his conjecture on the e®ect of wealth on the transition into self-
employment is not borne out. It is noted that our ¯nding is also similar to that obtained by
Lindh and Ohlsson (1996), based on Swedish data without controlling for risk aversion, ¯nd
that self-employment is positively associated with winning lotteries.
The coe±cient of risk aversion is statistically signi¯cant and negative. This implies that
those who are more risk averse are less likely to be self-employed. This ¯nding lends support
to the literature's theoretical studies, which either assume or conclude that the less risk
averse are more likely to be entrepreneurs. It is also consistent with the empirical ¯ndings
obtained by Van Praag and Cramer (2001) and Cramer, Hartog, Jonker, and Van Praag
(2002), who use a di®erent measure of risk aversion.
The results pertaining to the e®ect of other socioeconomic variables on the decision to
enter self-employment are similar to those obtained by previous studies (e.g., Evans and
Jovanovic, 1989; Evans and Leighton, 1989; Blanch°ower and Meyer, 1994; and Fairlie,
1999). For example, an African American is less likely to become self-employed, one's age
does not have any e®ect on business startups, one's length of job tenure (JOBTENt¡1) has
a quadratic e®ect (being negative initially and positive as the length of job tenure increases
further), being married (MSt¡1) has a negative e®ect, and years of education (EDU) have
a positive e®ect.
An individual's labor income in the previous year (denoted INCOMEt¡1) has a positive
e®ect on business startup. Our a priori conjecture is that INCOMEt¡1 may exert a positive
and a negative e®ect on business startup. A positive e®ect may arise from the fact that
INCOMEt¡1 is correlated with an individual's ability and ¯nancial situation, and a negative
e®ect may come from the fact that it poses as the opportunity cost of becoming self-employed.
Our ¯nding of a positive coe±cient for INCOMEt¡1 indicates that the ability and ¯nancial
situation e®ects are more important than the opportunity e®ect.
10The variable CASHt¡1 is to capture the e®ect of one's ¯nancial liquidity on the transition
into self-employment. However, the variable is negative and statistically insigni¯cant. It is
likely that the amount of net wealth is enough to pick up this e®ect.
Some of our estimation results are slightly di®erent from those obtained by previous
studies. The e®ect of family size (FSt¡1) is found to be positive on entering self-employment.
This is contrary to Fairlie's (1999) ¯nding that the number of children has statistically
insigni¯cant e®ects, and it has a positive e®ect for African Americans and a negative e®ect
for Caucasian Americans.
Our ¯ndings on the e®ects of whether one's father was self-employed (FSELF) and the
amount of lump sum (LUMPSUMt¡1) received are di®erent from previous studies, too.
While we ¯nd them to have no e®ects on the decision to become self-employed, others (e.g.,
Blanch°ower and Oswald, 1998; and Fairlie, 1999) ¯nd that they have positive e®ects.
4 Conclusion
In this study we look at the relationship between one's net wealth and business startups.
The empirical studies in the literature ¯nd that wealth is positively related to business
startups (notably Evans and Jovanovic, 1989), alluding to the existence of binding liquidity
constraints. However, Cressy (2000) argues that this relationship is spurious and is due to
the negative relation between wealth and absolute risk aversion (i.e., the DARA preference
structure).
The current study attempts to verify the conjecture proposed by Cressy and tests whether
Evans and Jovanovic's empirical results are robust to the inclusion of individuals' degree of
risk aversion. Our empirical analysis is based on a sample of individuals in the 1995{1997
waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, which contain a measure of the respondents'
degrees of risk aversion. In the empirical analysis, we estimate the e®ect of an individual's
wealth on his/her decision to become self-employed, allowing his/her degree of risk aversion
11to be a confounding factor. Our ¯nding on the e®ect of wealth on the decision to become self-
employed is similar to that obtained by Evans and Jovanovic. Thus, Evans and Jovanovics
results are robust to their omission of individuals' degree of risk aversion. Cressy's conjecture
receives no empirical support. Nevertheless, the DARA preference structure conjectured by
Cressy (2000) is found to be valid within our sample, since we ¯nd that our measure of risk
aversion (based on a constant relative risk aversion utility function) is not correlated with
wealth, implying that absolute risk aversion is decreasing with wealth.
Moreover, we ¯nd that the degree of risk aversion has a negative impact on the deci-
sion to become self-employed. This acknowledges the validity of some theoretical studies'
vital assumption/conclusion: That less risk averse individuals becomes entrepreneurs (e.g.,
Marshall, 1890; Knight, 1921; Kanbur, 1979; and Kihlstrom and La®ont, 1979).
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St Whether a previous employed household head becomes self-
employed between t and t + 1.




1=µ Household head's degree of risk aversion. 4.58
(2.06)
3.57
AGEt Age of household head in year t. 38.16
(9.73)
38
AGESQt Square of age of the household head in year t divided by 1000. 1550.61
(783.27)
1444
EDU Years of education of the household head. 12.31
(3.92)
12
AA Whether the household head is African American.




MSt Household head's marital status in year t.




FSELF Whether the household head's father has ever been non-farm self-
employed.




FSt Family size in year t. 2.94
(1.41)
3
WEALTHt Total wealth (in thousands of dollars) of the household in the 1994




value of principal residence
+value of other real estate assets
+value of vehicles












INCOMEt¡1 Total labor income of the household head in year t¡1 de°ated by




CASHt Total cash (including money in checking or savings accounts, in
thousands of dollars) of the household in the 1994 survey year de-




LUMPSUMt Amount of lump sum (in thousands of dollars) received by the
household (e.g., a big settlement from an insurance company, or an




JOBTENt Job tenure of the household head. 8.36
(8.24)
6
JOBTENSQt Job tenure squared of the household head. 138.80
(299.90)
36
15Table 2: Regression Results of the Degree of Risk Aversion
Dependent Variable 1=µ
(Degree of Risk Aversion)






























Normality Testn 13.06 |
[0.00]p |
Heteroskedasticity Testl 25.07 |
[0.00]p |
Observations 2259
yAsymptotic t-statistic in parentheses.
yyBootstrapped t-statistic in parentheses.
¤Statistically signi¯cant at 10% level.
¤¤Statistically signi¯cant at 5% level.
zPseudo-R2.
n Shapiro-Francia normality test.
l LM test for homoskedasticity.
pp-value in square parentheses.
16Table 3: Probit Estimation Results of the Transition into Self-Employment
Dependent Variable St
(Transition into Self-employment)


































log likelihood -664.0467 -664.0467
Observations 6292
yAsymptotic t-statistic in parentheses.
¤Statistically signi¯cant at 10% level.
¤¤Statistically signi¯cant at 5% level.
zStandard error of individual e®ects.
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